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NOTES.
A CLUB "SYSTEM" TO EVADE LIQUOR LAWS IN A PROHIBITION
DIsTRICT.-State laws throughout the Union, provide either that
the sale of intoxicating liquors be licensed by the State, or that the
sale be altogether prohibited within the limits of the State. The
State-wide prohibition Act of North Carolina, Chap. 71 Laws Ex.
Sess. 19o8, made it unlawful for any person or persons, firm or
corporation to manufacture or in any manner make, sell, or other-
wise dispose of, for gain, at any place within the State any spiritu-
ous, vinous, fermented or malted liquors or intoxicating bitters.
Under this act, there arose the case of St. v. Colonial Club,
decided December 14, i9IO, which sanctioned the ingenious "sys-
tem" by which a sale was converted into a bailment and the club
permitted to enjoy, within its precincts the use of intoxicating
liquors even in this prohibition State.
The "system" was shown by a special verdict of the jury. The
Colonial Club was a corporation organized under the laws of North
(394)
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Carolina, and had its club rooms accommodating its one hundred
and eighty members. The initiation fee was ten dollars and the
quarterly dues six dollars. Beside the President, Board of Direc-
tors and Treasurer, there was a manager, who stayed at the club
rooms most of the time. The club kept a book with order blanks
for beer and stubs corresponding in number t'o the order blank; this
book was kept by the club and when an order was made, a mem-
orandum was kept on the corresponding stub. These books were
paid for by the club and when an order was made the money was
paid to the manager, who turned it over to the treasurer. The
treasurer, having a banking account, banked the money and sent an
order to a liquor house, outside the State, accompanied by the club's
check in payment, which check corresponded to the amount re-
ceived from the member. The liquor was then sent in the member's
name, in care of the club, which made no charges and received iio
profits from the transaction. When the beer arrived, the member
got a book of coupons, entitling him to a corresponding amount of
beer from the general refrigerators, in which all the beer of the
other members was mingled. A bottle of beer was served the mem-
ber on surrender of a coupon.
Judge Manning held this transaction did not constitute a sale
by the club to its members, because the defendant was merely the
depository of the beer, ordered by the member and delivered in his
name and for his use to the defendant, who was acting solely as the
servant, agent or bailee without hire for such member. Hence the
only sale, which occurred, took place outside the State and since
the Legislature of North Carolina had no jurisdiction over this sale,
the defendant could not be convicted.
If the decision is correct, this "system" is truly ingenious for
in this same State, previous decisions had held that the same sort
of transactions and use of intoxicants for the same purpose under
other systems, offered by social clubs, was a "sale" and rendered
in State v. Neis, 2 a club steward guilty of selling liquors without
a license and in State v. Lockyear s guilty of a breach of the local
option laws.
To determine whether such a decision is correct, it is only neces-
sary to decide whether the process or system by which members of
a club obtain the title to a quantity of liquor to be disposed of by
the individual as he may desire is a mere "distribution" among its
members or is a "sale." The decisions on this point, whether the
club adopts the ordinary rules or a special "system," are in con-
flict, but the weight of authority is undoubtedly in favor of the rule,
that the distribution and consumption of liquors in a club by its
members is a "sale."
This view was adopted in Manning v. Canon City,' igo9 which
%S67 6 W 77r.
2o8 N. C. 787.
95 N. C. 633.
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decided that the distribution of liquors kept by an incorporated
club, to its members who pay therefor sums, which are used to
replenish the supply of liquor is a sale within the meaning of the
prohibition laws. In State v. Minnesota Club,5 i9o9, the distribu-
tion of intoxicating liquors by an incorporated club to its members,
though without profit, constitutes a sale. The decisions of the Su-
preme Courts of Alabama,6 Kansas, 7 Kentucky,8 North Carolina,9
Mississippi,O Michigan,"' Georgia,12 West Virginia,3 Louisiana,",
Maryland, 5 New Jersey" and Indiana,17 all support this general
doctrine.
On the other hand in Missouri,8 Massachusetts," New York
20
and Pennsylvania,2 ' the Courts, because of the inaction of the legis-
lature or of the district attorneys in not bringing former prosecu-
tions, hold that the furnishing of liquors by an incorporated social
club, organized in good faith, owning property in common, to which
the furnishing of liquors is merely incidental to the purposes for
which it was organized, does not constitute a sale, but the Federal
Courts of Massachusetts in U. S. v. Nittig,22 and of Pennsylvania
in U. S. v. Alexis Club,28 hold that such a transaction with club
members does not constitute a "sale."
The general rule, beyond doubt is that the distribution of liquor
by incorporated clubs to their members is a sale. What then is
most generally accepted to be a sale, cannot be converted into a
bailment by a mere trick, subterfuge, or "system" to evade the law.
2'
But even admitting that a "system" is capable of turning a sale into
a bailment, what the Colonial Club did, "system" or "no system,"
constituted a sale in every element. The members of this club paid
in addition to dues, whatever sum each thought proper to furnish
funds, with which to buy beer. Such fund becomes the property of
the club as in the case of general deposits in a bank. The club
then sends its own check for the amount of beer each member orders.
:45 Colo. 571.
i o6 Minn. 515.
'Martin v. State, 59 Ala. 34.
'State v. Haracek, 41 Kan. 87.
'Club v. Louisville, 92 Ky. 309.
* St. v. Neis, io8 N. C. 787 and St. v. Lockyear, 95 N. C. 633.
"Nogales Club v. St., 69 Miss. 218.
'People v. Soule, 74 Mich. 250.
" Mohrman v. St., 105 Ga. 709.
"St. v. Shumate, 44 W. Va. 490.
" St. v. Boston Club, 48 La. Ann. 485.
'Chesapeake Club v. St., 73 Md. 97.
"Newark v. Club, 53 N. J. L. 99.
"Marmount v. St., 48 Ind. 21.
"St. v. St. Louis Club, 125 Mo. 208.
Com. v. Smith, io2 Mass. 144.
'St. v. Adelphi Club, 149 N. Y. 5.
Klein v. Livingston,; 177 Pa. 224.
=U. S. v. Wittig, 28 Fed. 224.,
"U. S. v. Alexis Club, 98 Fed. 725.
&23 Cyc- 183.
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True the beer is sent in. the name of each member in care of the
club, but it is not placed on special deposit but mingled with all
the liquors on general deposit. The beer thereupon becomes club
property just as a general deposit in a bank becomes the property
of the bank. Each member can check on the club, and receive not
"his own beer but the quantity of beer for which he pays with his
coupons, just exactly as a depositor checks money out of a bank.
Though the beer was ordered in the member's name, yet it was ship-
ped in care of the club, received by it and mixed with the club's
other goods, and thus become the club's property subject to draft.
The use of the member's name was merely colorable, not changing
the true nature of the transaction. Had the beer been stolen, it
must be charged in a bill of indictment, as the property of the club,
or had a member broken into the club at night and regaled himself
with the beer, he could not plead the beer was his any more than
the depositor who breaks into a bank, and takes cash from the
vaults could set up the plea, that he was merely closing his account.
If an execution was issued against the club it could be levied on
the beer. Instead of members paying cash, and receiving liquor.in
exchange, they simply paid in advance, receiving therefor coupons,
which they cashed for liquor. Such a transaction, whether for
profit or for loss, is clearly a sale.
Chief Justice Clark, in a dissenting opinion, pointed out that
such devices to evade the law have been numerous and many of
them ingenious, but if the law exempts liquor selling by social clubs,
however respectable, by devices or "systems" however ingenious,
it should permit it to all clubs without devices or "systems."
The expression in the Declaration of Independence "equal rights
to all and special privileges to none," is not a figure of rhetoric but
the truest expression of American sentiment. "Privilege and priv-
ileged class are and ought to be intolerable and it comes irritatingly
near to a privilege when social clubs offering advantages of comfort
and luxury, that are only open to the more prosperous, escape the
prohibition of a statute because refined reasoning declares that by
carrying out a "system" a sale is not effected, but merely a distribu-
tion of the common stock of liquor among its members, while the
robust sense of the community, not excluding the club members
themselves, knows the transaction to be a "sale." C.S. H.
EFFECT OF THE SALE OF GOOD WILL.-Good will was first rec-
ognized some one hundred years ago' as a species of intangible
property and an asset of a going business. A problem soon arose
in the effect of transfer of the good will of a business as a restric-
tion upon the vendor. There slipped into the law an admission that
the vendor of the good will could, if he choose, set himself up in
a similar business to that which he had sold out, provided it be
Cruttwell v. Lye (i8io), T7 Vesey, Jr., 335.
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fairly and dearly a separate business. The ratio decidendi in these
first cases was an inquiry whether the assignor of the good will
made representations that the business which he had re-established
was the same or a continuation of the old business. If it were
found that he had made such representations, an injunction would
be granted, by analogy, to the infringement of trade marks or trade
names.
2
At this time good will was regarded to be lecal and to attach
particularly to the situs of the business. It is possible to see under
this conception why the vendor was allowed to set up a new busi-
ness,'at least where not in or adjacent to the premises sold. It-was
soon recognized" that too much emphasis had been placed on the
connection of the good will with the location and that the good
will might be rather associated with the business itself 4 or with
the business name,5 or even with the personality of the business
associates.6 But the rule had become well established that the ven-
dor could carry on a competing business, and some effect must be
given to his voluntary act in assigning for a consideration the good
will. Lord Romilly then and there took the stand7 that such a
vendor, although he might publicly advertise, was not entitled either
by private letter or by a visit, or by his traveler or agent, to go to
any person who was a customer of the old firm and solicit him not
to continue his business with. the old firm but to transfer it to him,
the new firm. This restriction was extended in a case which even
enjoined the vendor from dealing with the old customers,' it was
overruled9 and for ten years was disavowed; until in 1895 it was
re-established in the House of Lords,10 so that it may now. fairly be
said to be the-law in England.
This rule which would allow the new business but restrain
solicitation, has been adopted in a majority of jurisdictions in which
the problem has arisen, notably Michigan,1 New Jersey,12 Penn-
sylvania,18 Illinois,'4 and Rhode Island. 5 Other jurisdictions 6 have
expressly refused to enjoin solicitation reflecting the uncertainty in
England prior to the case in the House of Lords. Others have in
'Cruttwell v. Lye, ubi supra, citing Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Vesey, Jr., 2r5.
'Wood, V. C., in Churton v. Douglas, 5 Jurist N. S. 887.
'Brett v. Ebel; 51 N, Y. Sup. 573, mere control of all the trade with a
certain port.
'Churton v. Douglas, ubi supra.
Foss v. Roly, i95 Mass. 292.
'Labouchere v. Dawson (z872), L. R. 13 Eq. 322.
'Leggott v. Barrett (i88o), i5 Ch. Div. 306.
'Pearson v. Pearson (1884), 27 Ch. Div. r45.
'Trego v. Hunt (1895), L. R. 1896 A. C. 7.
Myers v. Kalamazoo Buggy Co., 54 Mich. 215.
' Newark Coal Co. v. Spangler. 54 N. J. Eq. 354.
"Wentzel v. Barbin, i89 Pa. 5o2.
"Rauft v. Reimers, 200 Ill. 386.1 Zanturlian v. Boornazian, 25 F 1I. I15.
"Bergamini v. Bastian, 35 La. Ann. 6o; Cottrell v. Babcock Mfg. Co., 54
Conn. i2; Vinall v. Hendricks, 33 Ind. Ap. 413; MacMartin v. Stevens,
37 Wash. 616.
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dicta"1 disapproved the rule. The subject had never been dis-
cussed in a court of last resort in New York until the case of Von
Bremen v. MacMonnies (i9IO), 2oo N. Y. 41. In this the Court
of Appeals overruled the previous holdings of the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court i s and lined New York up with the jurisdic-
tions avowing the English rule. The injunction restrained the de-
fendants from soliciting the trade of the customers of the original
firm and from dealing with such as had been already solicited. The
right of the defendants to carry on a competing business was not
denied. The court recognized the exception already made in Eng-
land'9 in the case of compulsory alienation of good will, as in bank-
ruptcy proceedings or by liquidation, where even solicitation is per-
mitted. However the present assignment, although made a few
weeks before the termination of the partnership as an alternative
for liquidation, it was held, did not come within this exception, but
must be regarded as voluntary.
The theory upon which all the cases are based, expressed as an
implied covenant in the sale or an equitable principle, is, that the
vendor has an obligation not to depreciate the value of what he has
sold.20 Now to engage in a similar business will certainly do this
to a greater or lesser extent. Still more so, public advertisement,
yet these are allowed the vendor. The line is only drawn when he
begins to personally canvass the old customers. This is said to be
an avowed endeavor to prevent the buyers of the good will receiving
the benefit of it, or an attempt to disturb them in its enjoyment. Why
is not keen competition equally such a violation? This seems, today
as when it was first enunciated, a thoroughly arbitrary distinction.
Massachusetts has evolved an exceptional yet more logical
rule.2 1 Discovering the prior cases were reconcilable with the stand
they were to take, her courts 22 disavowed the premise of the English
rule, namely, that the seller had an unqualified right to engage at
least in the same business. The effect of this voluntary assignment
of the good will is, they say, to preclude him from setting up any
competing business which will derogate from his grant. Whether
the new business derogates from the good will which he has sold
is a question of fact to be determined in each case. With this as a
working rule injunctions will be granted28 and good will will be
"White v. Trowbridge, 26 Pa. ii and Farrand v. Williams, 88 Mich. 473.
$ 138 App. Div. 319 and Ward v. Ward, 15 N. Y. Sup. 913; Cf. Close v.
Flesher, 8 N. Y. Misc. 2w.
"Walker v. Mottram, ig Ch. Div. 355.
Labouchere v. Dawson, ubi supra.
' Hutchinson v. Nay, 187 Mass. 262.
"Old Corner Book Store v. Upham, 194 Mass. ioi; Marshall Co. v.
New Marshall Co. (igog), 2o3 Mass. 41o, and cases cited therein.
'In Old Corner Book Store v. Upham, supra, and in Foss v. Roby, 195
Mass. 292, the vendors were enjoined from engaging in business in the city
wherein the former business was conducted. If the business were world-
wide, cf. Nordenfelt v. Gun Co. (1894), A. C. 535, under the Massachusetts
rule he could not have set up a similar business. Quaere, would that not
be the result in the case of Von Bremen v. MacMonnies, supra, where the
business was national in scope?
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recognized as a valuable asset2 4 where it would be impossible under
the English rule. The recognition of good will is of comparatively
recent origin, it has been seen, and the number of cases involving it
is increasing. Those jurisdictions which choose to follow the Eng-
lish rule must logically accept the final word in Trego v. Hunt. On
the other hand, they may choose the stricter Massachusetts rule
based on a logical test adapted to each case and prefer it to a rule
based on an arbitrary distinction.
25
S.L.H.
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY TO INDIVIDUALS FOR NONFEASANCE IN
THE OPERATION OF PARs.-Given a tract of land bordering on a
body of water which is devoted to the amusement and recreation
of the public, and to which end there is located thereon profit pro-
ducing facilities in the form of piers, pavilions, bathhouses, refresh-
ment stands, boat landings, and walks and drives and an open, unoc-
cupied area where the grass is kept green for the pleasure of visit-
ors and over which visitors are permitted to walk. A dangerous
condition exists on such open, unoccupied area by reason of the
admitted negligence of the person in whom the duty and means
to remedy it resides. No admission fee is exacted of any one who
enters this park, but an opportunity to spend his money is offered
him at the piers, refreshment stands, etc., to the indirect profit of
the person who owns the park. A woman who is rightfully in the
park and walking in this open area is, without any contributory
negligence on her part, injured by coming in contact with the dan-
gerous condition. If the owner of the park happens to be a private
individual or private corporation and it was the neglect of his or
its manager which caused the injury, there can be no doubt that
the rule of respondeat superior would apply and such private owner
would be held answerable to the injured party in damages. But if,
under"the same conditions, the owner happens to be a municipal
corporation and the negligent manager is the incumbent of an office
of the city created by law to exercise supervision and control over
parks, the same injured party is left without remedy under the rule
of the recent case of Bisbing v. City of Asbury Park.' In its last
analysis that case seems to make the right of an individual who has
thus been injured to a remedy to depend upon whether the profits
from the park go into the pocket of private persons or into the
treasury of a city. It is submitted that such a conclusion does vio-
lence both to the rights of the individual and to the principles upon
which municipal exemption from liability is founded.
'*Gordon v. Knott, 199 Mass. 173.
' The Pennsylvania case, Wetzel v. Barbin. ubi supra, decided on its
merits without any reference to precedent is equally reconcilable with either
rule. The injunction restraining the new business, a newspaper route, was
practically co-extensive with an injunction restraining solicitation.
278 Atl. 196 (igio).
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The general law may be stated to be that a city exercises func-
tions of two classes, private and governmental,
2 and that it is liable
for the negligent acts of its officers and employees in the due course
of duty to the same extent as a private corporation in respect to
matters of the former class ;s and in the exercise of its government~l
functions, the municipality possesses the attributes of sovereignty,
and is not liable in tort in the absence of a statute imposing such
liability.4
The difficulty arises in determining whether a given duty is gov-
ernmental or private, and it is at this point that the authorities differ.
The cause of this conflict which makes it impossible to deduce from
the mass of conflicting cases any satisfactory rule or principle to
guide in the determination of this question, is stated in one case
5 in
the following language: "This is because ,the line between powers
exercised by the municipalities in their public capacity and for pur-
poses pertaining to the preservation of the public health, safety, and
morals, and those exercised for the convenience, advantage, and
benefit of a city and its inhabitants, is often so narrow that the dis-
tinction between them cannot well be defined, or supported by
good reason." It seems to be one of those questions which must be
determined by all the circumstances in each particular case.
It is outside the purpose of this note to go into a consideration
of the principles underlying municipal exemption in general, further
than to state them in the hope that they may throw some light to
guide in the determination of how far municipal exemption from
liability to individuals should be carried. The Supreme Court of
New Jersey, in which State the principles underlying city and county
exemptions are held to be identical,6 states these principles, in a
case which raised the question of the liability of a county for injury
resulting from negligence in not keeping a bridge along a public road
in repair, as follows: " * * * the duty is owed to the public,
and not to each individual who may have occasion to use the bridge,
and the adoption of any other rule would be highly inexpedient and
destructive of the public interests, by subjecting these public cor-
porations to numberless suits for every petty neglect occasioning
inconvenience to any one."'" In a word, the basis seems to be public
convenience.
a Wilbox v. Rochester, 190 N. Y. 137; Hedge v. Des Moines (Iowa), 119
N. W. 276; Evans v. Kankakee, 231111. 223; Gilemor v. Salt Lake City (Utah),
89 Pam~ 714.
*Brown v. Salt Lake City (Utah), 93 Pac. 570; Bond v. Royson, 13o Ga.
646; Young v. Co., 126 'Mo. App. r; Posey v. N. Birmingham (Ala.), 45 S.
663; Todd v. Crete (Neb.), ix3 N. W. 172; Wilcox v. Rochester (N. Y.),
'Valentine v. Englewood (N. J. Err. & App.), 71 Atl. .44; Clayman v.
N. Y., 117 App. D. 565; Bond v. Royson, supra; Judson v. Winsted, 8o Conn.
384; Kehoe v. Rutherford, 74 N. J. Law 659; Dayton v. Glasser, 76 0. St. 47?
'Louisville v. Prinz, io5 S. W. 948 (Ky. 1907).
:Pray v. Jersey City, ,3 N. J. Law 394 (i868).
'Liviiinore v. County of Camden, 29 N. J. Law 245 (xrOi).
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Apparently in recognition of the fact that the rights of indi-
viduals have often outweighed the benefit of public convenience,
many States have by legislative enactment imposed municipal lia-
bility in many instances where judicial decisions under the common
law denied it. In some States the courts have, themselves, drawn
a distinction between governmental duties of a judicial and those
of a ministerial nature, imposing liability for negligence in the per-
formance of those of the latter.8 These two facts must argue that
in a jurisdiction where the arbitrary common law rule is in force
in a close or doubtful case, the presumptions should prevail in favor
of the individual.
The maintenance and operation of public parks without cor-
porate or individual gain or profit has been held to be a purely public
purpose such as will exempt the city from liability for negligence.9
This is rested upon the ground that "the municipal authorities are
charged with the duty of maintaining the public health, and that
parks where exercises and recreation can be indulged in, and pure
and clean air breathed, contribute largely to the health of the com-
munity." Admitting that the rule of city exemption is properly
extended to free public parks, how far does the fact that the city
receives income from a park affect its right to exemption? There
can be no doubt that a general indulgence in sailing, bathing in the
sea and all the exercises incident thereto, and the attendance upon
concerts and amusements in piers and pavilions, and the breathing
of sea air while riding in a rolling chair would contribute largely
to the health of any community; but it is submitted that when a city
receives a revenue from the very things which give a seaside park
its peculiar health producing qualities, it ceases to be in reality a
public park and becomes a health resort to those only who can pay
the price. The city receipts from such a park produce a fund out
of which damages may be paid those who receive injury from negli-
gent management, and it is believed that the rule of convenience
should break down under such circumstances, and that the city's
liability should be the same as that of a private individual. And
it is submitted that the fact that certain areas within the boundaries
of the park are unleased and kept in grass in order to add to its
attractiveness should not relieve the city from the same liability
as to those parts, any more than that fact would relieve a private
owner from liability as to a particular area which is not directly
producing profit to him. The health producing qualities of those
areas, if they have any in themselves, would seem to be only inci-
dental to the business of conducting a profit producing seaside park.
This view is fortified by the fact that the enabling act in the
case under consideration, which gave the city the right to receive
profits from one portion of the park, also imposed the duty and
'Barree v. Cape Girardeau, 112 S. W. 724 (Mo. 19o8); Engelking v.
City of Spokane, iio Pac. 25 (Wash. igiO) ; Schigley v. City of Weseca, 1i8
N. W. 259 (Minn. i9o8).
'Louisville v. Prinz, supra.
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put in the city's hands the means of keeping the unleased portions
in a safe condition. And if it is a question of construction of the
legislative intent, it would seem reasonable to infer that the license
in respect to one portion and the duty in respect to another were
not intended to be divorced. This inference seems the more reason-
able in view of the fact that not only were repairs and improve-
ments on both leased and unleased portions to be made out of a
common fund which was to be derived as profits from the leased
portions, but those profits were contemplated to be of such a size
as would enable the city to pay the purchase money for the whole
park after the cost of maintenance had been paid.
If these considerations are pertinent the conclusion seems to
be inevitable that the city should be held to the same liability in re-
spect to the whole park, and in virtue of the fact that it is a park
conducted for profit to the city, the city's liability should be the same
as that of a private owner..
J.F.S.
